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Dallas
Fire-Rescue Investigation Report
Firefighter Fatality -- Michael Lee DePauw
Two-Alarm Fire at 6737 Briar Cove Drive
December 5, 2002
On December 5, 2002, the Dallas Fire-Rescue
Department responded to incident #106764, a fire at a large
single-family residence in the north central section of Dallas.
While battling a fire in the attic of this residence, Captain
Michael Lee DePauw would succumb to a heart attack and perish in the
line of duty. This report will endeavor to document the facts
surrounding the fire incident and the death of Captain DePauw.
BACKGROUND
Building Construction
The residence at 6737 Briar Cove Drive is a
3,570 square-foot, two-story, single-family home in the Northwood
Hills Estates (Figure 1). Built in 1963, in a Greek classic style,
it has brick veneer construction, a gable roof with composition
shingles, and a pier and beam foundation with no basement. The
fire was confined to the attic area above the second floor.
Fire Cause
The fire at 6737 Briar Cove Drive, which
escalated to two alarms, was classified as accidental, with the
official cause listed as an electrical short.
Captain Michael L. DePauw’s Activities on
December 5, 2002
Captain Michael L. DePauw, 51, a thirty-year
veteran firefighter, commanded the crew on Engine 56 and was the
station officer on the C Shift at Fire Station #56 located at 7040
Belt Line Road. The following are the on-duty activities of Captain
DePauw during his last shift, December 5, 2002, prior to his arrival
at the two-alarm fire at 6737 Briar Cove Drive.
Captain DePauw reported for duty at
approximately 06:20. For most of the day, Captain DePauw assisted
Battalion Chief 2 in his office located at Station #56 with the
preparation of the leave schedule for 2003.
At 13:55, Engine 56 responded, along with
Engine 22, Truck 20, and Rescue 48, to a major accident on
southbound Central Expressway (Highway 75) at the intersection of
LBJ Freeway (I-635). They were not needed at the scene and were
cancelled.
At 16:19, Engine 56 responded, along with
Rescue 20, to a heart attack call at 7419 Overdale Drive.
At 20:10, Engine 56 was dispatched on the first
alarm to Incident #106764, a structure fire at 6737 Briar Cove
Drive, where he was stricken.
At no time during the shift of December 5,
2002, did Captain DePauw complain of any pain or discomfort.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The First Arriving Companies
The first alarm on Incident #106764 was
dispatched at 20:10:58. The initial units dispatched were Engine
56, Engine 22, Engine 20, Truck 20, Rescue 22, and Battalion Chief
2. Captain Michael DePauw was the officer on Engine 56, which was
the first unit to arrive. They reported out with smoke showing and
parked directly in front of the residence (Figure 4). Captain
DePauw investigated and ordered that his crew advance a 1¾”
pre-connected hose line. Captain DePauw and two firefighters took
the attack line up the stairs to the attic. Four crew members from
Truck 20 assisted Engine 56 upon their arrival. Truck 20’s crew set
ladders and pulled ceilings in the upstairs bedroom, so that the
engine crew could access the fire. After directing a stream into
the attic, Captain DePauw passed the hose line to a Firefighter from
Engine 20.
Battalion Chief 2 responded from Station 56,
and was second on the scene. Battalion Chief 2 assumed command and
set up the command post in front of the residence. The Command
Technician directed the second arriving engine company, Engine 22,
to standby at the corner hydrant. Shortly thereafter, Engine 22
laid a 5” supply line to Engine 56 as directed by Command. Seconds
later, as the fire broke through the roof, the Command Technician
requested a second alarm as directed by Battalion 2. The Captain
and one Firefighter from Engine 22 stretched a second 1¾”
pre-connected hose line up the stairs as a backup. Command entered
the structure and observed Captain DePauw and a Firefighter
extinguishing the fire. As he exited, he observed Engine 22
entering with the backup line and then heard “Man down.” Crews
suspended extinguishment efforts and assisted in removing Captain
DePauw from the building.
The
Extinguishment Activities of Captain DePauw and Crew
One Firefighter from Engine 56 began
extinguishment in the attic while Captain DePauw pulled slack for
him and assisted with the nozzle. The second Firefighter assisted
in pulling hose. Captain DePauw then directed the second Firefighter
to get a pike pole in order to pull the ceiling in the next room
(Figure 2). They knocked the fire down and repositioned to attack
the fire in another location (Figure 3). Several firefighters then
heard Captain DePauw give the order for the backup hose line to be
charged. Captain DePauw then reached for his radio and, by several
accounts, fell to the floor as if he had tripped. Falling against
the leg of a Firefighter from Truck 20, Captain DePauw didn’t move.
It was immediately apparent that something was wrong with Captain
DePauw. A Firefighter from Engine 20 and a Firefighter from Truck
20 advised, “Man down,” and received immediate help. Members from
Engine 56, Engine 20, and Truck 20 carried Captain DePauw down the
stairs and out onto the front lawn, where CPR was initiated. It is
estimated that this occurred no more than ten to twelve minutes into
the incident.
Resuscitation Efforts
After being removed from the structure by
members of Engine 56, Engine 20 and Truck 20 it was determined that
Captain DePauw was in cardiac arrest, and CPR was initiated. An AED
was initially utilized which indicated that Captain DePauw was in
ventricular fibrillation. Two shocks were administered, but they
were unsuccessful in establishing a normal rhythm. The crews from
Rescue 22 and Rescue 20 arrived and began ALS treatment. An IV was
established. The EKG indicated that Captain DePauw was in
ventricular fibrillation with pulseless electrical activity (PEA) at
a rate of 36. Captain DePauw was placed on a backboard, loaded into
Rescue 20, and transported to nearby Medical City Hospital. CPR was
continued during transport. Captain DePauw’s intubation was
confirmed twice. While en route, he had PEA at a rate of 115, and
drugs were administered for a second and a third time. At 20:40:59,
they arrived at Medical City, where chest compressions were
continued for 25-30 minutes until doctors pronounced Captain DePauw
deceased.
The cause of death is stated on the report of
the Medical Examiner as atherosclerotic and hypertensive
cardiovascular disease.
Fire Extinguishment Efforts
When the Deputy Chief (806) arrived, Captain
DePauw was being loaded into Rescue 20 for transport. Battalion 2
passed command to the Deputy Chief, informed him of the identity of
the stricken firefighter, and briefed him on the incident and
company assignments.
The Deputy Chief directed the crew of Engine 56
to go to the hospital to be with Captain DePauw. Battalion 2 and
the Command Technician were also released to go to the hospital.
Battalion Chiefs 4, 3, and 7 remained on the
scene, commanding sectors at the incident. Crews from Engine 20 and
Truck 20 continued with the extinguishment operations on the second
floor, while Truck 7’s crew performed salvage operations. Engine
41was assigned to the roof. Several crews, including Engine 7,
Engine 13, and Truck 41, stood by in staging. Truck 57, assigned to
staging, directed traffic at Hillcrest and Briar Cove until relieved
by the Police.
Due to the seriousness of Captain DePauw’s
condition, Command directed that the incident be treated as if an
on-duty fatality had occurred. The scene was secured, and overhaul
was delayed until Captain DePauw’s equipment and protective clothing
had been collected and secured. Fire investigators sketched the
scene and interviewed witnesses. The status board was secured and
photographed, and the scene photographed and videotaped.
After Captain DePauw was transported his
protective gear was retrieved and secured. This consisted of an SCBA
with 500 p.s.i. remaining, a helmet, gloves, a bunker coat, personal
alert device, a flashlight, a radio, and one boot. Missing
initially were his bunker pants and one boot that had been
transported with him to the hospital. The bunker pants and
remaining boot were retrieved at the hospital and secured. Captain
DePauw’s equipment was inspected at 07:00 on the morning of December
6, and all of it was found to be in compliance with Federal and
State standards and in good condition.
Throughout the incident, all emergency crews
operated in compliance with all State and Federal guidelines
dictating fireground operations, including Incident Command,
two-in/two-out, and personnel accountability.
Critical
Incident Stress Management
Critical Incident Stress defusing for the crews
assigned to the incident took place later that evening at Station 7
and Station 20. A full debriefing was conducted for all personnel
involved on December 11th.
Time Line
20:10:58 First alarm (E22,
E20, E56, T20, T7, Battalion 2, Rescue 22)
unknown Second Chief (Battalion 4) dispatched
20:14:40 Approximate time of Engine 56’s arrival on the
scene
20:14:55 Battalion 2 arrived on the scene
20:16:59 Engine 20 arrived on the scene
20:17:10 Truck 20 arrived on the scene
20:17:26 Second alarm (E7, E13, E41, T41, T57, Battalion
7, Rescue 20, Deputy 806,
Investigator, Battalion 3)
unknown Battalion 4 arrived on the scene
unknown Truck 7 arrived on the scene
20:19:29 Rescue 22 arrived on the scene
20:20:17 Engine 22 arrived on the scene
20:23:16 Engine 7 arrived on the scene
20:23:17 Rescue 20 arrived on the scene
20:26:09 Engine 13 arrived on the scene
20:26:29 Truck 57 arrived on the scene
20:26:50 Engine 41 arrived on the scene
unknown Truck 41 arrived on the scene
unknown Battalion 7 arrived on the scene
20:40:59 Rescue 20 arrived at hospital
20:45:00 Out taps
20:47:03 Rescue 7 dispatched
20:47:41 Rescue 22 arrived at hospital
20:55:24 Rescue 7 arrived at the scene
21:56:12 Rescue 20 cleared
21:56:18 Rescue 22 cleared
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